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Abstract. Competition law has proliferated around the world. Due to data limitations,
however, there is little systematic information about the substance and enforcement of
these laws. In this paper, we address that problem by introducing two new datasets on
competition law regimes around the world. First, we introduce the Comparative
Competition Law Dataset, which codes competition laws in 130 jurisdictions between
1889 to 2010. Second, we introduce the Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset,
which provides data on competition agencies’ resources and activities in 100 jurisdictions
between 1990 and 2010. These datasets offer the most comprehensive picture of
competition law yet assembled and provide a new foundation for empirical research on
the legal regimes used to regulate markets.
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I. Introduction
Competition law is one of the most commonly deployed instruments to regulate
the operation of markets and is a standard feature of economic policy in developed and
developing countries alike.1 But as Figure 1 illustrates, this has not always been the case.
Canada enacted the world’s first modern competition law in 1889, followed by the United
States a year later.2 From 1900 until the end of WWII, however, only 13 countries adopted
competition laws. During the cold war, another 28 countries adopted competition laws.
After the fall of the Soviet Union and the transition of many countries to market
economies, the number of countries with competition laws exploded. Between 1990 and
2010, 78 countries adopted competition laws. By 2010, our research suggests that 135
jurisdictions—129 countries and 6 regional organizations—had competition laws.
Despite this striking spread of competition law, beyond a few key jurisdictions,
there is little systematic data on countries’ competition regimes. 3 In fact, most crossnational empirical studies on the nature and effects of competition law have failed to
account for the remarkable variation in competition regimes around the world and instead
relied on a binary coding of whether or not any competition law exists on the books. Even
fewer studies measure the operation of these laws on the ground, including whether they
are complemented with adequate resources and meaningful enforcement efforts.
In this paper, we introduce two new datasets that provide a detailed coding of
competition laws and their enforcement around the world. First, the Comparative
Competition Law Dataset provides detailed coding on competition law provisions from
131 jurisdictions—126 countries and 5 regional organizations—from the beginning of
modern competition law until 2010.4 Second, the Comparative Competition Enforcement
Dataset provides data on enforcement resources and activities for 100 jurisdictions during
Although this area of law is called antitrust law in the United States, we refer to it as competition law because
that it is the standard name for the field outside of America and we hope for our datasets to be used by researchers
from around the world.
1

Although Canada’s competition law from 1889 is generally considered the first modern competition law, we
also identified a few earlier competition laws and included them in the dataset. For instance, the dataset includes
England’s Statute of Monopolies of 1623 and France’s Le Chapelier Law of 1791.
2

3

Part II provides a brief review of this literature.

4

Appendix 1 provides a list of the jurisdictions included in both datasets.
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the years 1990 to 2010. To our knowledge, these datasets represent the most
comprehensive effort to collect data on the world’s competition law regimes. Both datasets
are available for download at www.comparativecompetitionlaw.org.
In order to introduce these new resources, this paper explains the processes used
to collect these datasets, describes their coverage, discusses their limitations, and reports
several stylized facts about competition law around the world revealed by the data. For
instance, to highlight the content of the Comparative Competition Law Dataset, we show
the variance in the policy goals that these laws promulgate; document how countries carve
out different industries from the scope of these laws; and illustrate how some categories
of authority granted by competition statutes have grown over time while others have
waned. To highlight the content of the Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset,
we show how Russia and other former members of the USSR have used competition law
in a fundamentally different way than other countries; document that, despite the vast
proliferation of competition law agencies around the world, most enforcement activities
are carried out by a small number of jurisdictions; and compare the regulation of mergers
by the United States and the European Union.
By introducing these datasets, our goal is to make two larger contributions. First,
these datasets will allow scholars to examine the drivers, diffusion, and impact of these
laws. We are therefore aiming to elevate the quality of the many empirical research projects
on international competition law that are currently underway or that will be forthcoming.
Second, our project provides a template for similar cross-national data collection efforts
in other areas of the law. While we are aware of a handful of other projects that have
systematically coded specific aspects of countries’ legal regimes (Elkins, Ginsburg, &
Melton 2009; Law & Versteeg 2011; Chang, Garoupa, & Martin Wells 2018), we are not
aware of any existing cross-national datasets that include legal coding and enforcement
data that compare to this research project in scope and scale. Our hope is that our efforts
inspire other scholars of comparative law to launch similar studies in other fields.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Part 2, we review prior efforts to collect
comparative data on competition law. In Part 3, we introduce the Comparative
Competition Law Dataset and document several stylized facts about the regulation of
competition. In Part 4, we describe the Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset
2
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and highlight stylized facts about competition enforcement resources and activities around
the world. In Part 5, we briefly conclude.
II. Prior Data Collection Efforts
Our project is not the first effort to collect data on competition policy around the
world. Instead, there have been dozens of research projects that have reported at least
some comparative data on competition law. But although these projects have produced a
number of important findings and deserve credit for breaking new substantive and
methodological ground, many of these datasets suffer from important limitations. In
Appendix 2, we provide a complete list of empirical research in the field of comparative
competition law of which we are aware,5 but here we briefly summarize the four categories
of projects that have reported such comparative competition law data.
The first, and most common, data collection category is a binary coding of whether
competition law exists or not in any given country in any given year. For example, Kee &
Hoekman (2007), Petersen (2013), and Gutmann & Voigt (2014) all simply code countries
that have a competition law as “1” and countries without as “0.” 6 Although a binary
variable for the presence of a competition law regime may be appropriate for some
applications, this type of data is obviously limited by not accounting for variation in the
nature of countries’ competition laws or the intensity of their enforcement. This is
problematic for many applications because there is tremendous variation in the content of
competition laws across countries and over time.
Second, a handful of datasets go beyond a binary measure and capture some of the
nuances in the competition laws that countries have adopted. These datasets code whether
countries have specific provisions in their competition law. For instance, Hylton & Deng
For Appendix 2, we tried to identify comparative empirical studies that introduce original measures of
competition law or policy in more than one country, and exclude studies that rely on existing as opposed to
original data. In addition to empirical studies that seek to measure laws and their enforcement, other empirical
studies have focused on measuring competition as such (e.g., Aghion et al. 2005). These studies typically rely on
data such as industry concentration ratios, price markups, or the Lerner index that measures a firm’s market
power. Although these studies are relevant to research on competition, we do not review them or include them
in Appendix 2.
5

To be more specific, Kee & Hoekman (2007) collect more detailed enforcement data for a single year, 2000,
but rely on a dummy variable in their analyses after noting that “there is no comprehensive data base that indexes
cross-country differences in competition law enforcement over our sample period.”
6
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(2007) and Nicholson (2008) developed indices that identify the presence or absence of
various types of provisions governing, for example, merger regulation, the prohibition of
anticompetitive agreements, or abuse of dominance. Notably, Hylton & Deng (2007) use
their data to develop a 30-point index of the overall scope and stringency of national
competition laws.7 The trade-off when producing this more detailed coding, however, has
been having a limited number of countries or years coded. For instance, Nicholson (2008)
provides data on 52 countries for just the year 2003, and Hylton & Deng (2007) provide
data on 102 countries for only the years 2001-2004.
Third, a few data collection efforts measure competition enforcement resources
and activity. For instance, Clougherty (2010) used data on enforcement budgets to exam
trends in competition policy and economic growth. Additionally, the Global Competition
Review (“GCR”) is an annual commercial publication that ranks competition agencies
largely based on their quantitative enforcement record.8 Similarly, the World Economic
Forum surveys companies actively competing in a market to try and capture countries’
overall enforcement efforts based on their “perceived effectiveness of competition
policy.”9 These datasets also are limited in their availability, coverage, and reliability. For
example, the GCR database is typically unavailable for public use, the data is limited to a
relatively small number of OECD countries for many years, and our research suggests that
the data is often unreliable.
Fourth, a few projects have collected a broad range of information on countries’
laws, enforcement resources and activities, and institutional features to develop a
composite index of competition policy. For instance, Voigt (2009) constructed a set of
indicators that reflect both the content of competition laws—including the extent to which
these laws reflect an economic approach—and institutional features such as agency
The
Scope
Index
is
available
at
the
“AntitrustWorldWiki”,
available
at
<http://www.antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Main_Page> (last visited August 13, 2018). For
an example of research relying on these indices, see Ma (2011).
7

GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ (last visited March 7, 2018). For an
example of academic research that has relied on the Global Competition Review data, see McCloughan, Lyons,
& Batt (2007).
8

The Global Competitiveness Report, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, https://www.weforum.org/reports/theglobal-competitiveness-report-2016-2017-1 (last visited Jan. 2, 2017). For examples of academic research that has
relied on the World Economic Forum data, see Krakowski (2005) and Sama (2013).
9
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independence. And perhaps most notably, Buccirossi et al. (2011) developed a composite
index that measures a range of features of competition laws, including the size of sanctions
available and the expected probability of detection. Given the breadth of their coverage,
perhaps unsurprisingly, these datasets have extremely limited coverage. Buccirossi et al.
(2011), for example, covers the years 1995-2005 for 13 OECD jurisdictions where data
were available.10 In other words, they were only able to obtain detailed information from
a handful of the worlds’ most advanced economies.
Although our datasets have their own limitations, we have sought to go beyond
existing datasets by increasing the number of jurisdictions, years, and the variables covered.
Importantly, we have separately collected datasets on competition laws and actual
enforcement resources and activity. We discuss these datasets in detail in the next two
sections.
III. Comparative Competition Law Dataset
We now turn to introducing the first of the two new datasets: the Comparative
Competition Laws Dataset. First, we explain our process for collecting the data. Second,
we explain the coverage of the dataset across countries and over time, as well as the
categories of variables that it includes. Third, we discuss the limitations of our data
collection efforts. Finally, we use the data to document new stylized facts about the goals,
exceptions, and authority contained in competition laws around the world.
A. Collection Process
The data collection was carried out over the course of six years with the help of
over 70 Columbia Law School students. The research team primarily comprised foreign
trained law students with relevant legal education and language skills because they brought
relevant local and regional knowledge to the project and made it possible to retrieve and
code laws that were not available in English.
The process of collecting the data entailed multiple steps. When we began the data
collection back in 2011, we first identified all the jurisdictions that had adopted a
10

Voigt (2009) provides data from 1990-2000 for 58 countries, but for a narrow range of variables.
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competition law by 2010—the year prior to when our data collection effort started. We
also chose the year 2010 as the end point to ensure that we could reliably identify and
obtain copies of competition laws that had been passed around the world, and also verify
if those laws subsequently entered into force.
For each of these jurisdictions, the research team identified and collected the entire
universe of relevant laws that had been passed dating back to each jurisdiction’s first
competition law. This included general competition laws, relevant sector specific
regulations, and other laws—like criminal laws or constitutions—that contained
provisions regulating market competition. For example, for the United States, we collected
every relevant federal law since the passage of the Sherman Act of 1890.
After gathering all of the competition laws, our research teams performed the
actual coding of the relevant statutory provisions. To do so, they completed a survey
hosted on Qualtrics.com for each law. This survey had 171 entry fields. These fields started
with basic identifying information—such as country, law name, year passed, and year
enacted—and then proceeded through questions related to substantive statutory
provisions. To develop this survey, we built on the efforts of Nicholson (2008) and Hylton
& Deng (2007) and asked questions covering the variables included in their studies.
However, we also included several new questions.
Each jurisdiction was assigned to two research team members for independent
coding. 11 Both followed identical procedures. 12 Importantly, the team members were
instructed to code the “competition law regime” in force in any given year, which means
that we layered together all the old and new laws in force in any given year to capture the
entire set of laws in force at a point in time. A more experienced student was employed as
a senior coder whose task was to offer guidance on ambiguous or complicated provisions.
We further reviewed this guidance. Once two team members completed a country’s
coding, the project leader retrieved the data from Qualtrics.com to prepare for a
While our goal was to double blind code every law, the laws of five jurisdictions were reviewed by just one
coder with the assistance of the senior coder due to language restrictions.
11

When proceeding through each section of the survey, the coder was asked to provide yes-or-no responses to
a series of questions regarding the existence of specific provisions related to that category. After providing a yesor-no response, the coder copied the actual, relevant statutory text from the laws of the country to write-in fields
that followed each question.
12
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discrepancy review. The discrepancy review was then assigned to a third coder, who
examined all fields for which the two team members provided differing responses, checked
the actual text of the underlying law, and selected the most accurate answer.13 The output
of the discrepancy review produced a final “consensus” response to every field for every
law. Finally, the data was converted to a country-year format to facilitate easy use by
researchers.
B. Coverage
Figure 2 shows the number of jurisdictions and laws covered in the dataset over
time. Our research suggests that 135 jurisdictions, including all 34 OECD countries, had
a domestic competition law by 2010. Six of those jurisdictions consist of regional
organizations, including the EU, which exercise supranational competition jurisdiction
over their member states. Of the 135 jurisdictions, we have complete coding of 131—126
countries and 5 regional organizations. Since many jurisdictions have multiple laws, we
coded 700 laws in total.14
Figure 3 depicts the six primary categories of variables that we coded for each
competition law. First, we coded a series of variables that capture any policy goals
embedded in a country’s competition laws, including whether the law specifically states
goals such as improving consumer welfare, efficiency, or social policy. Second, we coded
whether the law notes either an exemption or whether the law is sector specific. For
instance, we coded whether the law exempts state owned enterprises or export cartels, and
whether the law was specific to industries such as energy, telecom, or transportation. Third,
we coded a series of variables that capture the authority granted by the law in the regulation
of competition. This includes whether there is a private right of action, the possibility of
fines or imprisonment for violation, or extraterritorial application. Fourth, we coded a

The third coders were directed to provide a comment for each field in which they resolved a discrepancy,
explaining the reasoning behind their choice and pointing to the statutory language that supported their decision.
As during the first and second coding, the senior coder and we were frequently called upon to assist the third
coder performing the discrepancy review and ensure uniformity of interpretation across countries.
13

In two cases—the Dominican Republican and Botswana—the laws were passed prior to 2010, but did not go
into effect until after 2010. Although we still coded these laws and include them in the totals reported in Figure
2, these countries may not be included in various analyses that focus on laws in effect.
14
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number of variables about countries’ merger control regimes, such as whether merger
notification is mandatory or if efficiency defenses are allowed. Fifth, we coded variables
about the regulation of anti-competitive agreements, and, sixth, we coded variables about
the regulation of abuse of dominance. For each of the six categories, we attempted to code
variables that captured all relevant features of that competition policy. Taken together,
these variables provide a detailed picture of competition regimes from countries’ first
adoption of a competition law through 2010. For scholars interested in using this data as
a single variable, we have also created a composite index called the “Competition Law
Index” that draws on many of these variables to create a single picture of the regulatory
risk posed by countries’ competition regimes in each year from 1890 to 2010 (see Bradford
& Chilton 2018).
C. Limitations
While the coverage of our dataset far exceeds prior data collection efforts, it is not
complete. Thanks to our access to foreign law students, we were able to code laws in
Arabic, Armenian, Chinese, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, French, Finnish, German,
Greek, Hebrew, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Slovakian, Slovenian, Spanish,
Swedish, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, and Russian. But there were three countries and
one regional organization where language barriers or lack of access to the legal text have
prevented us from completing their coding: ASEAN, Djibouti, Faroe Islands, and Iran.
Additionally, there are some countries included in the dataset where we coded some
competition laws, but we could not locate all the laws that we believe may exist. Those
potentially incomplete countries are: Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, and Senegal.15
An additional potential limitation of our dataset is that we only coded competition
statutes and not case law. For those most familiar with American antitrust law, this may
seem like an important omission. However, a recent expert survey we conducted suggests
there are few countries outside the United States—primarily common law jurisdictions—
where courts play a significant role in creating new competition law.16 One of the questions
15

The dataset includes indicator variables for country-years that have either missing or incomplete coding.

To better understand the role of courts, agencies, and private parties in the administration of antitrust law, we
developed a short survey that we sent to competition law practitioners and scholars around the world. More
16
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in the survey asked: “In practice, do the courts generate new law by changing the scope of
the antitrust statutes in [insert country]? Please answer on a scale from 1 (no role) to 5
(extensive role).” Of the 86 countries from which we received survey responses, in only
11 jurisdictions did the respondents say that “courts play an extensive role” i.e., “courts
have the power to change the scope of antitrust law and frequently do so.” In a further 4
jurisdictions, the experts described the role of courts as “large” i.e., “courts have the power
to change the scope of antitrust statues and sometimes do so.” Thus, while limited to
competition statutes, this dataset captures the vast majority of competition laws in the
world and serves as an accurate proxy of the state of competition law in each country.
D. Stylized Facts About Competition Laws Around the World
To highlight the richness of this dataset, we will briefly examine the variance
around the world in three aspects of competition law: (1) the goals countries stipulate for
their competition law; (2) the industries that are exempted from coverage by competition
law; and (3) trends in the authority granted to agencies and private parties to enforce
competition law.
1. The Goals of Competition Laws
The promulgated goals of competition law convey important information about
the political, economic, and ideological commitments underlying its enactment. The goals
also often reveal what jurisdictions’ enforcement priorities are and how they are likely to
interpret the substantive commitments embedded in the law. There is considerable
variance in these goals across countries. The United States and the European Union are
perhaps the most well-known illustration of this point. Historically, the United States’
competition law was aimed at curtailing the concentration of economic and political
power, reflecting the fear that unfettered economic combination posed a threat to the
American economy, democracy, and society (Areeda, Kaplow, & Edlin 2013, at 35).
However, at least since the 1970s, the United States has endorsed the view that
specifically, we sent the survey to our professional network, contacts we had made while collecting the datasets
introduced in this paper, attendees of international competition law conferences, and members of the Academic
Society of Competition Law (ASCOLA). In total, 166 experts form 86 countries completed our survey.
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competition law should focus on the narrow pursuit of efficiency, which is typically
understood as maximization of consumer welfare (Orbacj 2011). The European Union, in
contrast, has always employed competition law for a greater variety of goals, including
fostering European integration (Fox 1997, at 340), even if consumer welfare remains its
primary objective. Moving beyond the United States and the European Union, although
some existing studies suggest that countries pursue a wide range of policy goals with their
domestic competition laws (Waked 2015), the topic has not been explored with data as
comprehensive as in our new dataset.
Panel A of Figure 4 plots the share of jurisdictions with a competition law that
have at least one of the eight goals we identified in Figure 3 from 1890 to 2010, and Panel
B plots the share of jurisdictions with a competition law with each of those eight goals in
2010. As Panel A shows, explicit goals have become more common over time. In 1950,
just 8% of jurisdictions with a competition law had one of the eight goals for their
competition regimes, but 64% of jurisdictions with a competition law did by 2010. Panel
B shows that although efficiency is considered to be a common goal of competition law,
in 2010 it is still explicitly identified by only 31% of the jurisdictions. Consumer welfare is
the most common goal of competition law and found in 40% of the jurisdictions. Beyond
these two goals, the other six goals we coded are less common. These goals range in
prevalence from development (in 15% of jurisdictions) to protecting exports (in 2% of
jurisdictions).
2. Limits in the Scope of Competition Laws
Countries commonly carve out certain industries or enterprise types from the
scope of their competition law. Our data shows that between 1950 and 2010, roughly twothirds of jurisdictions (68%) had at least one exemption in their laws in a given year.17
These exemptions are not only prevalent but also significant, both in terms of their
economic and political impact. Often, they tell an important story about the political
economy underlying a law, indicating which companies or industries enjoy special

More specifically, 59% of jurisdictions had an exemption in 1950, 70% in 1987, and the number has stayed
roughly stable since. For instance, 72% of jurisdictions had at least one exemption in 2010.
17
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privileges or protection by their governments. It is plausible, even likely, that countries use
exemptions as a way to shield certain industries or enterprise types from competition law
and hence give them an edge over their competitors in the marketplace. Alternatively, an
exemption may reflect the government’s view that certain enterprise types should instead
be subjected to sector-specific regulations, by which its idiosyncratic characteristics can be
better addressed. Our dataset offers the opportunity to systematically examine the types
of industries and firms that governments treat differently by exempting them from
competition scrutiny, and study how those exemptions differ across time and jurisdiction.
To illustrate the data, Figure 5 graphs the share of jurisdictions with a competition
law that either completely or partially exempts different industries. Like Figure 4, Panel A
shows the number of jurisdictions with a competition law that partially or completely
exempts at least one industry from 1890 to 2010, and Panel B shows the share of
jurisdictions that exempt specific industries in 2010. Panel A reveals that roughly half of
jurisdictions (49%) with a competition law include at least one partial or complete industry
exemption, and Panel B shows that Agriculture, Transportation, Insurance, Banking, and
Fishing are commonly exempted industries in 2010.
3. Authority to Enforce Competition Law
In addition to exploring the goals and exemptions listed in competition laws, our
data also makes it possible to explore the substantive provisions of regimes around the
world. To illustrate the possibilities, we next explore the variance in the enforcement
authority provided in competition laws. By authority, we refer to the provisions that
determine which parties can challenge alleged anticompetitive behavior and the types of
remedies that can be imposed if a violation is found. For instance, is there a private right
of action to allow private parties to bring competition cases? Are violations of the law
punishable with fines or prison time? Does the law apply extraterritorially?
Figure 6 displays the trends from 1950 to 2010 for each of the six authority
variables listed in Figure 3. For each variable, the plots show the absolute number of
jurisdictions (displayed on the left-hand y-axis) and the share of jurisdictions (displayed on
the right-hand y-axis) with a competition law that have each provision. Unsurprisingly,
given the huge increase in the number of jurisdictions with a competition law during this
11
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period, the absolute number of jurisdictions that have each authority provision in their
competition law has increased over time for all six variables. For instance, in 1950 just 6
jurisdictions had a private right of action in their competition law, but by 2010 that number
had increased to 71. What is more revealing, however, is the differences in the share of
jurisdictions that have each authority provision. Although the share of jurisdictions that
provide for Private Rights of Actions, Divestures, Damages, and Extraterritoriality have
all notably increased, the share of jurisdictions with provisions allowing for Fines and
Imprisonment for violations of competition laws has not. Instead, although they both were
equally common in 1950 (both remedies were found in 90% of competition laws in 1950)
these two remedies have spread in very different ways. More specifically, the share of
jurisdictions with Fines has stayed flat (98% of jurisdictions allow for fines in 2010), but
the share of jurisdictions that allow for prison sentences has declined dramatically (35% of
jurisdictions allowed for prison sentences in 2010). Notably, the availability of prison
sentences is a distinctive feature of American antitrust law, and our dataset reveals that this
provision has not diffused around the world.
IV. Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset
Although there are many more trends that can be explored in the Comparative
Competition Law Dataset, we now turn to introducing our second dataset: the
Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset. First, we again begin by explaining the
process we used to collect the data. Second, we summarize the countries and years covered
by the dataset, as well as the variables it contains. Third, we discuss limitations of the
dataset. Finally, we use the data to document three stylized facts about the enforcement of
competition law around the world.
A. Collection Process
The process of collecting the enforcement data entailed multiple steps. We first
determined the precise variables that we would use to capture the agencies’ enforcement
resources and activity. This determination was made based on a broad yet preliminary
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review of the extent and the type of data that agencies make available.18 After determining
the nature and scope of the data we wanted to collect, we trained and managed over 40
law students from Columbia Law School and the University of Chicago Law School to
carry out the data collection process over a period of five years. As with the team we
assembled to code the Comparative Competition Law Dataset, we recruited students from
a broad range of countries with relevant language skills and legal expertise.
We then identified jurisdictions with competition agencies in place between 1990
and 2010. For the agencies we identified, our research team first reviewed all publicly
available information on enforcement resources and activities. This entailed conducting a
detailed review of competition agency websites and annual reports, databases such as
GCR19 or “Getting the Deal Through,”20 and studies and research reports by organizations
such as the OECD or UNCTAD. When these diverse sources provided conflicting data,
we more heavily weighted data provided in the agencies’ annual reports. Most agencies
made some information on their resources or activities publicly available, but the extent
varied from very limited in the case of many non-OECD countries to quite comprehensive
in the case of a subset of established competition law jurisdictions.
After this review of publicly available information, we drafted questionnaires that
were individually tailored for each agency. That is, for any given agency, we developed a
questionnaire that focused only on information that we had not found in the public
domain or where the publicly available information was conflicting. We first contacted the
agencies by email in English. If this did not elicit a response, the correspondence took
place in Spanish, French, Russian, and Arabic, as needed. We typically contacted the agency
following an introduction by a personal contact within the agency, international
competition law bar, international legal academia, or an organization such as the
UNCTAD or ICN. These introductions, together with the contacts of foreign students at
Columbia and Chicago back in their home jurisdictions, were crucial in persuading the
agencies to share the data with us. To obtain the needed data for Australia, India, and the
Special thanks to Keira Campbell who was central in helping us determine the particular variables that were
most important and at the same time feasible to collect.
18

19

GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ (last visited March 7, 2018).

20

GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, https://gettingthedealthrough.com/ (last visited March 7, 2018).
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United Kingdom, we relied on formal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, while
continuing to benefit from proactive cooperation by government officials.
Most of the agencies we contacted responded with additional information—some
responded within day, while others responded after several requests over multiple years.
Where possible, we attempted to further verify the data provided to us by agencies through
comparison to our public sources. For example, we used the data we separately assembled
on competition statutes to confirm whether missing enforcement data reflected a lack of
authority to engage in certain enforcement activity or simple unavailability of data. For
some jurisdictions, we also conducted extensive review of individual enforcement
decisions to assemble additional data that the agencies did not otherwise have readily
available.21 After these steps, research assistants entered the responses to the questions
into the master dataset. As a final step, one of us further verified the entries into the master
dataset as part of a final review of the data.
B. Coverage
We attempted to collect data on all 116 jurisdictions that our research identified as
having established a dedicated competition agency by 2010. In the end, we managed to
obtain some data—whether on resources or activity or both—from 112 agencies
representing 100 jurisdictions. 22 While 103 individual agencies cooperated with us, we
relied solely on publicly available information for the remaining 9 agencies, as we could
not elicit a response from them. In 10 of the countries in our dataset, enforcement has
been carried out by more than one agency.23 For these multi-agency countries, we have
This included some developing jurisdictions such as Venezuela, but it also included some established
jurisdictions like Austria, the European Union, and South Africa.
21

In addition to the countries with competition agencies in our dataset, we collected data for three regional
organizations—the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), and the European Union (EU)—that exercise supranational competition jurisdiction over several
countries. It is worth noting that there are at least five other regional organizations that have some degree of
supranational competition policy: Andean Community (CAN), East African Community (EAC), Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and West African
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). However, the agencies for EAC and ECOWAS were established
after 2010 (the cut off for our data collection efforts), and we were unable to obtain data from the CAN, the
EFTA, and the WAEMU.
22

The countries with more than one agency in our dataset are: Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Luxembourg,
South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States.
23
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recorded the resources and activities for each agency separately but combined them in the
analysis based on our case-by-case review of their (at times complementary and at other
times overlapping) enforcement powers.24
We attempted to gather data for the years 1990, 1995, and 2000-2010 (although we
accepted whatever data agencies gave us, even if it was from, for example, 1994 or 1998).
We decided to try to collect data starting in 1990 for two reasons. First, the early 1990s
marked the beginning of a new era in competition enforcement when competition regimes
started to proliferate dramatically, including outside the OECD countries. Second, our
preliminary inquiries suggested that only a limited number of agencies could provide any
reliable data for any years prior to 1990. For many agencies, the data for 1990 or 1995 was
also sparsely available. If the agency was established after 1990, the first year of the agency’s
operation marks the first year of data gathering for that country. For instance, for Albania,
which established its agency in 2004, we have data for 2004-2010.
Figure 7 illustrates the availability of data over the relevant years. For the year 1990,
we managed to obtain some data for 15 jurisdictions. We obtained data for an increasing
number of jurisdictions for the subsequent years: 38 jurisdictions provided some data for
1995, 63 for 2000, 81 for 2005, and 97 for 2010. It is also worth noting that Figure 7
reports the number of jurisdictions that provided some data in a given year and not the
number of jurisdictions that provided complete data. Some jurisdictions were able to
provide some information for a given year—for instance, their competition agency’s
budget—but were not able to provide other information we requested—for instance, the
number of dominance investigations completed with a remedy.
Figure 8 depicts the primary 17 variables we collected that measure either the
resources the jurisdictions dedicated to competition law enforcement or the actual
enforcement activities.25 To measure the enforcement resources, we assembled data on the

We learned that many countries have gone through several changes in their competition institutions over the
years. In our dataset, we record the first year when a dedicated competition agency was established or when an
established agency first gained powers to enforce competition laws. Thus, a country could have had some
competition enforcement take place prior to establishing a dedicated competition agency if, for instance, another
Ministry (often trade or some other ministry responsible for commercial affairs) engaged in some prior
enforcement activity.
24

Although we tried to collect the same 17 variables for each jurisdiction for each relevant year, not all agencies
provided all variables for all relevant years. In addition, some agencies provided additional or slight variations of
25
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competition agency budgets and the number of agency staff members. To measure
enforcement activity, we gathered data on the three main anticompetitive activities that
competition agencies regulate: Merger Control, Anticompetitive Agreements, and Abuse
of Dominance. For Merger Control, we collected annual data on the number of mergers
notified to the agency, the number of mergers that proceeded to second stage review, the
number of mergers resolved with conditional clearance,26 the number mergers blocked,
and the number of mergers that were withdrawn. For Anticompetitive Agreements, we
collected annual data on the number of cartel investigations an agency opened, the average
duration of its cartel investigations, the number of cartel investigations it closed with a fine
or other remedy, and the total/average amount of cartel fines it imposed. For countries
that provide for criminal remedies, we further collected annual data on the number of
cases where criminal remedies were sought and the number of cases where criminal
remedies were imposed. Finally, for Abuse of Dominance, we compiled annual data on
the number of dominance investigations an agency opened, the average duration of its
dominance investigations, and the number of dominance investigations it closed with a
fine or other remedy.
C. Limitations
Like with the Comparative Competition Laws Dataset, our enforcement data has
limitations. First, as discussed in Part 4.2, despite trying to thoroughly comb public records
and directly communicate with enforcement agencies, there are several jurisdictions from
which we did not receive data, and other jurisdictions where the data we received was
incomplete. Second, this dataset only captures public enforcement, which leaves aside any
private enforcement activity. This omission again seems most significant for the United
States. This is confirmed by our expert survey, in which we also inquired about the

these standard variables if our requested metrics were not available. Thus, in the end, our dataset consists of 41
additional variables that are available for a limited number of jurisdictions.
By mergers resolved with conditional clearance, we refer to mergers that are approved subject to commitments
or conditions, such as behavioral or structural remedies. In some jurisdictions, these conditional clearances are
known as negotiated settlements. It is also worth noting that the breakdown of the variables we collect for merger
control is similar to Seldeslachts et al. (2009).
26
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significance of the private enforcement in each jurisdiction’s competition law regime.27
The survey specifically asked: “In practice, how important a role do private parties play in
enforcing antitrust law in [insert country]? Please answer on a scale from 1 (no role) to 5
(extensive role).” In the survey responses, the United States was the only country to receive
a score of 5.28 Thus, while the data we collected is limited to public enforcement, we
believe it captures the vast majority of competition law enforcement activity in the world.
Third, our data does not capture broader institutional features of competition law regimes.
Although we recognize that institutional arrangements—including governance structures
and management culture—can reveal important aspects of the actual operation of the law
and influence the overall de facto stringency of the competition law regime, these features
were not included as part of this data collection effort.
D. Stylized Facts About Competition Enforcement Around the World
To demonstrate some of the features of these data, we now turn to documenting
a few stylized facts about enforcement activity. In what follows, we introduce the data by
reporting raw numbers on enforcement activities and resources. Simply looking at raw
numbers, however, may mask the actual enforcement of competition law across
jurisdictions. For instance, meaningful comparisons of budgets need to account for the
size of countries’ economies. It may also be a mistake to conclude that the number of
investigations is a reliable proxy for the strength of an antitrust regime. Some regimes may
achieve deterrence without having to open investigations, while other regimes may only
investigate a fraction of actual violations. That said, to illustrate these data, we examine:
(1) the extensive use of competition investigations by Russia and other former members
of the USSR; (2) the countries that have devoted the most resources to competition
enforcement and had the most investigations; and (3) the merger review activity of the
United States and the European Union.

27

For more information on the survey, see supra note 16.

The experts in just four further jurisdictions responded that “private parties play a large role.” These
jurisdictions were Germany, Jordan, Slovenia, and Spain. In the other 64 countries we surveyed, the experts
described the role of the private antitrust enforcement as “insignificant,” “limited,” or “inexistent” in their
jurisdiction.
28
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1. Competition Law Enforcement by Russia and Former Members of the USSR
Perhaps the most striking trend in the enforcement data we collected is the
staggering number of investigations conducted by Russia and the members (and associate
members) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (“CIS”).29 Although the former
members of the USSR that never joined the CIS—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have
enforcement patterns that are similar to the median agencies in the dataset, the members
of the CIS are dramatic outliers. To illustrate this, Figure 9 presents data on competition
enforcement resources and activities while breaking out CIS members from the other
countries in the dataset.
Russia is the most important part of the story shown in Figure 9. Russia’s
competition law enforcement activities bear little resemblance to the rest of the world. For
example, Russia had an arresting 89% share of the world’s total Abuse of Dominance
investigations closed with remedy in 2010. While the United States closed 2 dominance
investigations with remedies and the European Commission closed 4 in 2010, Russia
closed 1,453 dominance investigations with remedies that year. Russia similarly remains an
outlier when compared to other emerging economies: Brazil closed 1 dominance
investigation with a remedy that year while India, China, and South Africa closed 0, 0, and
2, respectively. While abuse of dominance investigations is the area where Russia is the
most notable outlier, Russia is also active in other areas of enforcement. For instance, it
prohibited or conditionally cleared 83 mergers in 2010, which represents 26% of all merger
enforcement action in that category across the world that year. But even that figure pales
in comparison with the 578 mergers that Russia reported as prohibited in 2009 (for
comparison, the rest of the world prohibited 224 mergers in 2009).
In our follow-up research and conversations, the Russian agency offered several
explanations for their distinctive enforcement patterns. First, Russia relies on competition
law as a tool to pursue price regulation, which increases the number of investigations.
Second, the agency also described many Russian product markets as being highly

The CIS formed when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. At its conception, the CIS consisted of ten former
Soviet Republics: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
29
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concentrated, explaining the need for frequent interventions. 30 Finally, the agency
confirmed that it deals with many small cases as opposed to focusing on large ones.
However, these official explanations do not tell the entire story. First, although
Russia may be using competition law to target highly concentrated domestic markets and
pursuing small cases, its enforcement efforts also target large international firms. Just last
year, Russia fined Google $6.75 million for abusing its dominant position by forcing
retailers to install apps on cell phones using Android software (Grove 2016). Russia’s
competition agency is also investigating Apple Inc. in a price fixing case (Perlman 2016).
Second, the regulation and categorization of various anticompetitive activities in Russian
law and agency reporting is inconsistent with international norms.31 For example, the high
cartel activity numbers likely include cases that are simply horizontal (non-cartel)
agreements between competitors or even cases that others would characterize as vertical
agreements. 32 The Russian agency also uses competition law to curb inflation and to
control prices.33 The Russian concept of abusive behavior also includes many practices
that do not fit under any standard theory of competitive harm, like initiating abuse of
dominance investigations for firms accused of “infring[ing on] rights/interests of third
parties” (Khokhlov 2014, at 34). Third, experts have described Russian competition law
enforcement as “relentless” and “excessive,” and noted Russia’s tendency to pursue
objectives unrelated to competition (Girgenson & Numerova 2012). In fact, Girgenson &
Numerova (2012) argue that the general public is very keen to see the agency go after
“excessive” prices and supports the use of competition law as an instrument for price
control. This is particularly true against major Russian industrial players, like Gazprom and
Rosnef, that operate in politically sensitive industries like agriculture and energy.

Russia ranked 88th out of 139 countries for “Extent of Market Dominance” and 115th for “Intensity of Local
Competition” in the World Economic Forum Competitiveness Report for 2010-2011, (lower rankings are
associated with higher levels of competition, e.g., Germany ranks 1st for “Extent of Market Dominance”). See
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf (last visited March 22,
2018).
30

New Indicators of Competition Law and Policy in 2013 for OECD and Non-OECD Countries, OECD
Economics Department Working Papers No. 1104 ECO/WKP (2013), at 21.
31

As of 2012, Russia has made a distinction between cartels and other restrictive agreements, narrowing the
scope of what constitutes a “cartel” (Khokhlov 2014, at 32-33).
32

33

OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 2011 (Dec 2011).

19
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339624

Kazakhstan and Ukraine also have unusually high enforcement levels. In 2010,
Kazakhstan resolved 49 dominance investigations with remedy, which is over eight times
more than the United States and the European Union combined. For Ukraine, we were
not able to obtain data for dominance investigations closed with remedy. But our data
shows that Ukraine alone opened 621 dominance investigations in 2010, following 614
and 480 in 2009 and 2008, respectively. The numbers are high for cartel investigations as
well: Ukraine initiated 272 cartel investigations in 2010 while Kazakhstan initiated 39.
Although we do not have data on cartel investigations closed in Ukraine, Kazakhstan
closed 34 cartel investigations with remedy in 2010. Like in Russia, many of the cases may
be directed at smaller companies. The Kazak antimonopoly legislation, for instance, allows
the agency to initiate dominance investigations against companies with market share of
less than 35%.34
2. Jurisdictions with the Most Enforcement Resources & Activities
Although the huge number of competition investigations initiated by Russia and
other members of the CIS is perhaps the most surprising trend in the enforcement data,
there are also a number of small markets that have been unexpectedly active players in
competition law enforcement. To illustrate this, Figure 10 presents the trends for the five
countries with the most enforcement resources and activities based on their 2010 data.
The countries that were best resourced are not particularly surprising—instead,
staff sizes and budgets appear to correlate strongly with market size. With respect to staff
size, the United States had the greatest number of staff in 2010 with a combined 1,320
people working in antitrust enforcement at Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission. Japan had the second highest staff numbers, with 791 people working on
competition law in 2010, followed by the European Union, Brazil, and Canada with 590,
425, and 420 staffers working in each agency, respectively.35 With respect to budget, the

Law No. 144 of the Republic of Kazakhstan (19 Jan. 2001) Concerning Competition and Restriction of
Monopoly, Art. 14, 16; see also Commercial Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 375 (29 Oct. 2015) (the
aggregate market share threshold for anti-competitive concerted practice increased from 15% to 35%, liberalizing
the regulation of smaller market share holding entities).
34

35

The median agency had 62 people working at it in 2000 and 56 in 2010.

20
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339624

United States also dedicated the most resources to competition law enforcement. The
combined Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission budget for competition
enforcement was 288 million USD in 2010. China established its three competition
agencies in 2008 and immediately vested them with significant budgets. In fact, in 2010,
the combined budget of Chinese agencies was 220 million USD, which was the second
highest budget held by any jurisdiction. Following the United States and China, the next
highest budgetary resources in 2010 were found in Japan (96 million USD), United
Kingdom (73 million USD), and Australia (59 million USD). These can be compared to a
median agency budget of 3.3 million USD in 2010.
Figure 10 also presents trends for the five countries that engaged in the highest
levels of six types of enforcement activities in 2010. Many of the countries that were most
active across these different areas of enforcement are large, well-resourced, and established
jurisdictions, such as the United States, the European Union, Brazil, Germany, and South
Korea. These are regional leaders that undertake cases that often have an impact far
beyond their own jurisdiction. However, among the top enforcers we also see some more
surprising, small agencies, such as Bulgaria, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, and Namibia. There
can be idiosyncratic reasons for some of these small countries’ high activity levels.
However, one likely reason is that these are often relatively small (and hence more
concentrated) markets or geographically more isolated markets that can rely less on
regulators in large and well-connected economies doing the enforcement for them.
Competition enforcement may hence be particularly important for these small countries
dominated by a few large companies that control a substantial part of the economy in
question (Gal 2003). In other cases, these high activity levels may reflect particular features
of a country’s law. For instance, the reason Ireland reports such high number of abuse of
dominance investigations is that the Irish authority reviews every complaint and counts
that as a new investigation even if the investigation is promptly closed in the absence of
any anti-competitive concerns.
3. Comparing Merger Review in the United States and the European Union
The United States and the European Union garner the most attention in
conversations about international competition law (Fox 2010). Many comparative law
21
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papers, lectures, courses, and conferences are focused on these two jurisdictions alone.36
Although one goal of our data collection efforts is to make it possible to look beyond these
two traditional competition powers and examine how competition law has gone global,
our data can also be used to exam trends in established jurisdictions like the United States
and the European Union. To illustrate this point, we conclude by examining an area that
has been the subject of a great deal of debate over the last several decades: merger review.37
While the United States has exercised control over mergers since 1914 and adopted
mandatory merger notification in 1976, the European Union only began to exercise
authority to review mergers in 1990. Figure 11 illustrates several key trends in merger
review in the twenty years following the European Union’s adoption of a merger review
regime. As the first panel shows, from 1990 to 2010, the United States systematically
received more merger notifications than the European Union. During this period, the
United States received 2,319 notifications per year on average. In contrast, the European
Union received 217 notifications per year on average. The greater overall United States
activity in merger enforcement is likely a function of both deal flow and notification
thresholds. Not only is there typically greater M&A activity in the United States, the
baseline for merger review activity—the notification thresholds—differs and hence
catches somewhat different deals, at least at the margin.38
However, Figure 11 also shows that the picture looks different when comparing
the percentage of the notified deals that are subjected to an in-depth review, a conditional
clearance, or an actual prohibition. On average, 5% of notifications lead to a second
request investigation in the European Union while only 3% are investigated in depth in
the United States.39 Similarly, on average, the European Union conditionally clears 6% of

A notable exception is the scholarly attention China and a few other emerging competition jurisdictions have
received. See, e.g., Gerber 2010; Hylton & Deng 2007; Williams 2005.
36

It is important to note that European Union Member States also play an important role in the enforcement of
competition law in Europe (e.g. Barros et al. 2013), and looking at European Union Commission activity alone
may undercount competition enforcement taking place across the European Union as a whole.
37

The United States bases its threshold on merging parties’ assets while the European Union uses revenue as the
decisive factor, making the overall numbers difficult to compare (Gidley & Paul 2009).
38

It is worth noting that second stage investigations contain some important differences across jurisdictions. For
example, in the US, conditional clearances only take place after the second request is issued whereas in the
European Union the Commission can also clear a merger conditionally in Phase I.
39
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the mergers notified while this figure is 1% in the United States. In terms of prohibitions,
the European Union averages at 0.5% of mergers notified to it while the United States’
average prohibition rate is 0.3% a year.
Given the European Union’s reputation as the world’s most stringent competition
regime (Bradford 2013), the European Union’s higher relative challenge rate is not a
surprise. Conventionally, the European Union is portrayed as being less trusting of the
self-correcting forces of the markets and more confident in the ability of the regulators to
improve market outcomes. The European Union is also viewed as being more hostile to
dominant companies, and hence more inclined to restrict mergers that may lead to greater
dominance. While both jurisdictions recognize that mergers can lead to efficiencies and
are seen as often agreeing on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers, the European
Union is more inclined to challenge vertical and conglomerate mergers, which the United
States presumes as efficient except in rare instances.
Interestingly, this transatlantic divergence in challenge rates diminished after 2000.
There could be several explanations for this. For one, in 2002 the United States and the
European Union agencies signed the “Best Practices” agreement, which sets forth how
the two authorities can work together to promote cooperation and convergence in their
merger review processes. 40 Additionally, 2002 and 2004 are considered watershed
moments in European merger control. In 2002, the European courts departed from their
traditional, restrained judicial review and, in an embarrassing rebuke to the Commission,
annulled three Commission merger decisions within a span of five months (Overd 2002).41
The Commission responded to these setbacks by radically reforming the substance and
procedure it uses for merger review (Gerber 2003; Vranas-Iveris 2008; Baskoy 2008). This
process culminated in the adoption of a new merger regulation in 2004.42 These events
may have contributed to a more restrained review in the second decade even though the
conditional clearances remained relatively high. Of course, the European Union’s
US-EU Merger Working Group Press Release IP/02/1591, Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger
Investigations (Oct. 30, 2002).
40

Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II-02585; Case C-440/07 P Commission v. Schneider
Electric SA, 2009 E.C.R. I-00073; Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel, 2004 O.J. (L 43) 13.
41

Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings (The EC Merger Regulation) 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1.
42
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challenge rate has steadily declined over the course of the two decades and it would be
difficult to estimate how much can be attributed to any such external shocks as opposed
to a more gradual shift in the European Union’s policy over time.
V. Conclusion
This paper introduced two new datasets on competition law around the world: the
Comparative Competition Law Dataset and the Comparative Competition Enforcement
Dataset. These datasets are freely available for download and formatted for easy use. We
envision that these datasets can be put to a wide range of uses. For one, they can be used
to study the diffusion of competition law—or specific components of competition law—
across countries (e.g. the data we collected can be used as a dependent variable).
Additionally, the data can be used to study the effect of competition policy on things like
economic growth and development (e.g. the data we collected can be used as an
independent variable). Moreover, the data can be used to account for competition policy
and market regulation by scholars studying a range of other topics (e.g. the data can be
used as a control variable). Finally, these datasets may be of interest to scholars doing nonquantitative work because they make it possible to quickly look up the provisions of
(almost) every country’s competition regime. Taken together, we hope these datasets will
advance the study of competition law specifically and the empirical study of comparative
law more generally.
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Adoption of First Competition Law
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Figure 2: Comparative Competition Law Dataset – # of Jurisdictions & Laws
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1990

2010

Figure 3: Comparative Competition Law Dataset – Main Variables
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Figure 4: Comparative Competition Law Dataset – Explicit Goals
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Figure 5: Comparative Competition Law Dataset – Exempted Industries
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Figure 6: Comparative Competition Law Dataset – Authority Provisions
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Figure 7: Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset – Jurisdictions With Data
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Figure 8: Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset – Main Variables
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Figure 9: Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset – Resources & Activity
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Figure 10: Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset – Top Players
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Figure 11: Merger Review by the United States and the European Union
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Appendix 1: Jurisdictions in the Comparative Competition Datasets
Albania

Dominican Republic*

Kosovo*

Romania

Algeria*

Egypt

Kuwait*

Russia

Argentina

El Salvador

Kyrgyzstan*

Saudi Arabia

Armenia

Estonia

Laos*

Senegal

Australia

Ethiopia*

Latvia

Singapore

Austria

European Union

Lithuania

Slovakia

Azerbaijan

Fiji

Luxembourg

Slovenia

Barbados

Finland

Macedonia

South Africa

Belarus*

France

Madagascar*

South Korea

Belgium

Gabon*

Malawi

Spain

Benin*

Gambia*

Malaysia*

Sri Lanka*

Bolivia*

Georgia

Mali

Sweden

Bosnia and Herzegovina

German Federal Republic*

Malta*

Switzerland

Botswana*

Germany

Mauritius

Syria*

Brazil

Greece

Mexico

Taiwan

Bulgaria

Greenland

Moldova

Tajikistan*

Burkina Faso

Guatemala*

Mongolia

Tanzania

Burundi*

Guyana*

Montenegro

Thailand

CAN*

Honduras

Morocco

Trinidad and Tobago*

CARICOM

Hungary

Namibia

Tunisia

COMESA*

Iceland

Nepal*

Turkey

Cameroon

India

Netherlands

Ukraine

Canada

Indonesia

New Zealand

United Kingdom

Central African Republic*

Ireland

Nicaragua

United States of America

Chile

Israel

Norway

Uruguay

China

Italy

Pakistan

Uzbekistan*

Colombia

Ivory Coast

Panama

Venezuela

Costa Rica

Jamaica

Papua New Guinea

Vietnam

Croatia

Japan

Peru

WAEMU*

Cyprus

Jersey Channel Islands

Philippines

Yugoslavia

Czech Republic

Jordan

Poland

Zambia

Czechoslovakia

Kazakhstan

Portugal

Zimbabwe

Denmark

Kenya

Qatar*

* Only in the Comparative Competition Law Dataset
** Only in the Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset
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Appendix 2: Prior Efforts to Empirically Measure Competition Law

Year
1997

Author(s)
UNCTAD

2000

Dutz, Mark and
Vagliasindi,
Maria

2005

Clougherty,
Joseph

2005

Krakowski,
Michael

20052006

CUTS Civil
Society Report

2007

Hylton, Keith
& Deng, Fei

Article Name
World Investment
Report 1997:
Transnational
Corporations,
Market Structure
and Competition
Policy
Competition
Policy
Implementation in
Transition
Economies
Antitrust Holdup
Source, CrossNational
Institutional
Variation, and
Corporate Political
Strategy
Implications for
Domestic Mergers
in a Global
Context
Competition
Policy Works: The
Effect of
Competition
Policy on the
Intensity of
Competition - An
International
Cross-Country
Comparison
Competition
Regimes Around
the World

Antitrust Around
the World: An

# of
Countries
Covered
79

Metric for
Competition Law/Policy
The year competition law is
introduced.

Years
Covered
Binary for
first year of
policy

Competition law adoption,
enforcement, competition
advocacy and institutional
effectiveness.

1997

18 (26 for law
adoption)

Number of mergers
monitored, restructured,
prevented, or abandoned.

1992-2000

27

Experience in enforcing
competition law (measured
by years competition law in
place). Variable constructed
with the help of UNCTAD
(1997) data.

2003-2004

101

Summaries of competition
legislation and
implementation around the
world. Cross-national raw
data but no systematic
metrics collected.
Antitrust Scope Index
(composite index based on

Binary for
first year of
policy

119 countries

2001-2004

102
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Empirical Analysis
of the Scope of
Competition Laws
and Their Effects
Imports, Entry
and Competition
Law as Market
Disciplines

substantive provisions in
competition laws (builds on
2008 Nicholson index,
developed in 2004)
Competition law adoption,
enforcement resources
(staff/budgets),
investigations, cases
sanctioned, fines imposed.

Composite indicator on the
"toughness of competition,”
measured by 13 indicators,
some measuring competition
policy, others actual
competition (relies on
existing data but composite
indicator novel)
13 objective features of
competition policy across
four categories: (1) agency
independence, (2) cartels, (3)
dominance and (4) mergers.
The year competition law is
introduced.

2007

Kee, Hiau Looi
& Bernard
Hoekman

2008

Aiginger, Karl

The Impact of
Competition on
Macroeconomic
Performance

2008

Borrell, JoanRamon & Juan
Luis Jiménez

The Drivers of
Antitrust
Effectiveness

2008

Kronthaler,
Franz

2008

Nicholson,
Michael

2009

Seldeslachts, Jo

Effectiveness of
Competition Law:
An Empirical
Analysis
An Antitrust Law
Index for
Empirical Analysis
of International
Competition
Policy (builds on
2004 FTC
working paper
series by the same
author)
Settle for Now but
Block for
Tomorrow: The

2000 (entire
study covers
years 19811998; but
competition
data only for
year 2000).
Analysis
relies on
binary
variable.
Different
years for
different
variables –
generally
around
2003-2006

31 (entire
study covers
42 countries)

2004

47

Binary for
first year of
policy

84

Antitrust Law Index
(composite index based on
substantive provisions in
competition laws)

2003

52

Mergers notified, monitored,
settled and prohibited.

1992-2005

28
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26

Deterrence
Effects of Merger
Policy Tools
The Economic
Effects of
Competition
Policy - CrossCountry Evidence
Using Four New
Indicators

2009

Voigt, Stefan

2010

Clougherty,
Joseph

2010

Waked, Dina

2011

Buccirossi,
Paolo et al.

2011

Forslid et al.

2013

Petersen, Niels

Competition
Policy Trends and
Economic
Growth: CrossNational
Empirical
Evidence
Antitrust
Enforcement in
Developing
Countries:
Reasons for
Enforcement &
Non-Enforcement
using ResourceBased Evidence
Measuring the
Deterrence
Properties of
Competition
Policy: The
Competition
Policy Indexes

Indicator consisting of four
variables: (1) substantive
content of competition laws;
(2) degree to which laws are
based on economic analysis;
(3) formal independence of
agency; (4) factual
independence of agency.
Data generated via surveys
sent to competition agencies.
Competition agencies’ annual
budgets; ratio of economists
to lawyers employed by
authority; number of mergers
notified to authority

Based on
“currently
valid
competition
law.”

57 countries
with
competition
law (plus 37
countries
without)

1992-2007

32

Competition agencies’ annual
budgets and staff.

Adoption of
law- 2009

40

Competition Policy Indicator, 1995-2005
measuring quality and
intensity of competition
policy focusing on agency
features, resources, activity
levels, sanctions and quality
of law in the books. Data
generated via surveys sent to
competition agencies.
Trade costs and
The year competition law is
Binary for
timing of
introduced.
first year of
competition policy
policy
adoption
Antitrust Law and The year competition law is
1960-2005
the Promotion of introduced.
Democracy and
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13

24

154

Economic
Growth
New Indicators of
Competition Law
and Policy in 2013
for OECD and
Non-OECD
Countries

2013

OECD

2014

Gutmann, Jerg
& Stefan Voigt

2016

2017

Lending a Hand
to the Invisible
Hand? Assessing
the Effects of
Newly Enacted
Competition Laws
Cremieux,
Enforcement of
Pierre &
Anti-Collusion
Snyder, Edward Laws Against
Domestic and
Foreign Firms
Global
Rating
Competition
Enforcement
Review (GCR)

2018

IMD

World
Competitiveness
Yearbook

2018

World
Economic
Forum

Global
Competitiveness
Report

Competition Law and Policy
Indicator, which is a
composite indicator
measuring (1) scope of
action, (2) policy in
substantive areas, (3) probity
of investigation, and (4)
competition advocacy Data
generated via survey sent to
competition agencies.

2013

49

The year competition law is
introduced.

1971-2012

119 countries
with
competition
law (rest
without)

The total number of cartel
investigations where violation
found, nationalities of fined
firms, and the amount the
fines.
Resources of the competition
agencies (budget/staff);
investigations and remedies
across various areas of
enforcement activity. Data
generated via survey sent to
competition agencies.
Effectiveness of competition
legislation.
Data generated via survey
sent to executives.
Effectiveness of antimonopoly policy. Data
generated via survey sent to
executives.

1994-2014

2

2001-2017

37

1989-2018

Varies but 63
in 2018
edition

1979-2018

Varies but
137 in the
2017-2918
edition
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